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The Goods/Services Dichotomy and the U.C.C.:
Unweaving the Tangled Web
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C." or "the
Code") applies to "transactions in goods."' While the U.C.C. does
not define "transactions," it does define "goods."12 Therefore, if a
contract is purely for the performance of services, Article 2 does not
apply.3 Problems arise, however, when what is supplied in a contract
involves both the sale of goods and the performance of services. The
dichotomy becomes crucial when one party wishes to assert rights
under the U.C.C.
4
The question of whether Article 2 applies to a contract is one of
fact.5 Courts have developed various tests to answer this question in
transactions involving both goods and services. Each of these tests
purports to provide a court with guidelines for determining whether
the transaction in question should be characterized as primarily one
for goods or for services. Using the "predominantly service" test, a
court looks at the intent and the objective of the parties to determine
if the transaction is one that primarily involves services.6 Using the
second test, the "predominant factor" or "thrust" test, a court applies
the U.C.C. to the transaction if the "thrust" of the transaction is the
sale of goods. 7 Under the third test, the "final product" test, relying
on the U.C.C.'s definition of goods, a court looks at the end or final
I Section 2-102 states in relevant part: "Unless the context otherwise requires, this Arti-
cle applies to transactions in goods." U.C.C. § 2-102 (1978)..
2 Section 2-105(1) defines "goods" as follows:
(1) "Goods" means all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are
movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than the money
in which the price is to be paid, investment securities (Article 8) and things in ac-
tion. "Goods" also includes the unborn young of animals and growing crops and
other identified things attached to realty as described in the section on goods to be
severed from realty (Section 2-107).
U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (1978).
3 * Such a contract would not come within the scope of Article 2. See note I sufpra; see aso
I R. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-105:35 (3d ed. 1981).
4 These rights can include warranty protections (§§ 2-312 to 2-318) and statute of limi-
tations protections (§ 2-725). Article 2 must apply to a contract before an aggrieved party
can claim its protections.
5 Squillante, General Provisions, Saler, Bulk Transfers and Docuzents of Title, 34 Bus. LAw.
1491, 1492 (1979); R. ANDERSON, supra note 3, § 2-105:51.
6 See Note, Contracts for Goods and Services and Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 9
RuT.-CAM. L.J. 303, 303-05 (1978); notes 23-42 infa and accompanying text.
7 See Note, supra note 6, at 308-12; notes 43-56 infa and accompanying text.
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product to make the goods/services determination. 8 Under the final
test, the "policy" test, a court simply determines on an ad hoc basis
whether Article 2 should apply under the particular facts in
question.9
Using these different tests has led to understandably inconsistent
applications of Article 2 provisions. 10 A single, comprehensive test
might eliminate some of the confusion and lead to more consistent
decisions. Any new test would not solve all problems or anticipate all
possible situations. Such a test could, however, lead to more consis-
tent applications of the U.C.C.
Part I of this note reviews the relevant provisions of the U.C.C.
and discusses the difficulty of determining whether Article 2 applies
to a given set of facts. Part II reviews the tests which the courts have
developed and discusses the advantages and the disadvantages of
each test. Part III suggests a single test by which both practitioners
and courts could determine whether the provisions of Article 2 would
apply to a given contract.
I. Provisions of the U.C.C.
Article 2 applies to "transactions in goods."'1 I Because a sale of
goods is definitely a transaction within the scope of Article 2,12 the
question of whether Article 2 applies to a particular fact situation
becomes whether the contract is in fact one for the sale of goods or
for something other than goods, such as services.
The U.C.C.'s definition of goods emphasizes a tangible quality
and movability.13 If the contract in question is clearly one for the
8 See Note, supra note 6, at 309-12; notes 57-69 infra and accompanying text; see also note
2 supra.
9 See Note, supra note 6, at 312-15; notes 70-75 infra and accompanying text.
10 See cases cited in Annot., 5 A.L.R. 4th 501 (1981).
11 See note 1 supra. Because the term "transactions" is not defined, practitioners have
argued that "the term encompasses contracts other than sales and that Article 2 is therefore
applicable to these non-sale contracts." Annot., 4 A.L.R. 4th 85, 91 (1981). Predictably,
courts have reached different conclusions when asked to decide whether Article 2 applies.
Some courts have found that the scope of Article 2 is broader than sales. See, e.g., Westmont
Tractor Co. v. Viking Explor., Inc., 543 F. Supp. 1314 (D. Mont. 1982) (Article 2 applied to a
lease arrangement); Mieske v. Bartell Drug Co., 92 Wash. 2d 40, 593 P.2d 1308 (1979) (Arti-
cle 2 applied to a bailment). On the other hand, other courts have limited the scope of
Article 2 to sales. See, e.g., DeMatteo v. White, 233 Pa. Super. 339, 336 A.2d 355 (1975)
(Article 2 not applied to a contract for the construction of a residence); Computer Serv. v.
Beacon Mfg. Co., 328 F. Supp. 653 (D.S.C. 1970), afd, 443 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1971) (Article 2
not applied to a contract for data processing services). See also 3 R. DUESENBERG & L. KING,
SALES AND BULK TRANSFERS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1.03[4] (1982).
12 See U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (1978).
13 For the U.C.C.'s definition of goods, see note 2 supra. Obviously, that which is mova-
[1984]
[Vol. 59:717]
sale of goods or the performance of services, the question of whether
the U.C.C. applies is answered easily. However, many contracts call
for both the sale of goods and the performance of services. If the
contract calls for both, the U.C.C. may or may not apply. Courts
usually base this decision on whether the sales aspect or the service
aspect predominates. 14 This factual determination is often difficult
to make, since most contracts which call for both the sale of goods
and the performance of services do not differentiate explicitly be-
tween these aspects. The parties agree on one price for the entire
contract without specifying the portion respectively allowed to the
sale of goods and the performance of services. Moreover, both the
sale of goods and the performance of services are often crucial to the
successful completion of the contract. The goods may be useless un-
less services are performed to make them functional. The services
may be pointless in themselves, but necessary to make the goods
functional. One aspect may well be useless without the other. 15 Be-
cause determining which aspect of the contract predominates is often
difficult, results can be inconsistent.16
In deciding whether the U.C.C. should apply to a particular
transaction, a court should consider the U.C.C.'s policy of liberal
interpretation.1 7 This policy encourages a court to construe the
U.C.C. "so as to secure a reasonable meaning, to effectuate the inten-
tion of its framers, and to make the Code workable and service-
able."' 8  The policy of liberal interpretation gives a court the
opportunity to be flexible when reconciling precedent with a new set
ble is tangible. Securities and "things in action" are intangible, and thus excluded from the
category of goods.
14 See cases cited in Annot., 5 A.L.R. 4th 501 (1981).
15 See, e.g., Meyers v. Henderson Constr. Co., 147 N.J. Super. 77, 370 A.2d 547 (1977).
The contract at issue quoted one price for the sale and installation of overhead doors, with no
differentiation between sales and service. Both were necessary for the successful completion of
the contract. See also note 49 infra nd accompanying text.
16 See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
17 Section 1-102 of the U.C.C. provides in relevant part:
(1) This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying
purposes and policies.
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial transac-
tions;
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom,
usage and agreement of the parties;
(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.
U.C.C. § 1-102 (1978); see also note 75 infra.
18 R. ANDERSON, supra note 3, § 1-102:16; see 1 A. SQUILLANTE &J. FONSECA, THE LAW
OF MODERN COMMERCIAL PRACTICES § 2:1 (rev. ed. 1980).
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of circumstances. 19 Thus, in determining whether the U.C.C. should
apply to a particular transaction, a court cannot look only to prece-
dent in the jurisdiction, but must look also to the policy behind the
U.C.C., and balance those considerations.
20
II. The Current Tests
Article 2 does not provide any guidelines for interpreting con-
tracts calling for both the sale of goods and the performance of serv-
ices. Therefore, in order to determine whether Article 2 applies in a
given situation, courts have developed various tests. Each test pro-
vides its own set of guidelines for determining whether the transac-
tion in question is one for the sale of goods or the performance of
services, or, given that both goods and services are involved, which
predominates. Four separate tests can be identified:2 1  (1) the
predominantly service test; (2) the predominant factor or thrust test;
(3) the final product test; and (4) the policy test.
A. The Predominantt4y Service Test
When applying the predominantly service test, a court examines
the parties' intent and objective as evidenced in the transaction.
22
The New York Court of Appeals articulated this test in Perlmutter v.
Beth David Hospital,23 a pre-Code case that involved an issue similar
to the Code's goods/service dichotomy. 24 In Perlmutter, the court
found that a blood transfusion which infected the recipient with
hepatitus was not a sale of goods but rather was part of the service of
medical treatment. Therefore, the warranty provisions of the New
York Sales Act did not apply.2 5 The court stated that the parties had
19 See U.C.C. § 1-102, comment 1 (1978). How flexible a court actually is seems to de-
pend at least to some extent on the starting point of the test the court employs. Thus the
predominantly service test, which looks first at the services performed, tends to find that the
U.C.C. does not apply. See text accompanying notes 29-42 infra. The predominant factor
and the final product tests, which focus on the goods supplied, apply the U.C.C. more often.
See text accompanying notes 48-56 and 57-69 inj/a.
20 The policy test illustrates this balancing act most clearly. See text accompanying notes
70-75 in/a.
21 See notes 6-9 supra and accompanying text.
22 See Note, supra note 6, at 303-05.
23 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
24 While not the first court to address this issue, the Perlnutter court delineated its reason-
ing clearly, and its analysis resembles closely that of post-Code cases using the predominantly
service test. See id. at 104-06, 123 N.E.2d at 793-95.
25 The relevant portions of the warranty provisions of the Sales Act read as follows:
1. Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller the
particular purpose for which the goods are required, and it appears that the buyer
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bargained for the medical treatment, not for the sale of supplies used
in the treatment.2 6 The court based its decision at least in part on
the public policy rationale that hospitals provide essential services
and should not be held liable for circumstances which they could not
control while exercising due care.27 Other courts have cited Perlmut-
ter, and some have extended its basic reasoning to transactions not
involving the supplying of blood.28
In applying the predominantly service test, courts examine the
structure of and the language contained in the contract which may
indicate the parties' objective. The parties may treat the transaction
as a whole in the contract, not dividing it into separate sale and serv-
ice components. If the parties do not specifically designate a transac-
tion as a sale of goods, and if the service aspect is crucial, a court may
deem the contract to be one in which service predominates. For ex-
ample, in Gulash v. Splarama, Inc. ,29 the plaintiffs sued for damages
based on the breach of an implied warranty for a swimming pool.
The Superior Court of Connecticut rejected the claim, stating that
since the contract was not specifically designated as a sale of the
pool,30 the contract for the installation of the pool was primarily for
labor. The court could not separate the sale of the materials from the
installation process. Therefore, because the contract did not separate
the transaction into specific components and because the plaintiffs
could not establish the existence of any implied warranty, the court
found that the U.C.C. did not apply.
3 1
relies on the seller's skill or judgment (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or
not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such
purpose.
2. Where the goods are bought by description from a seller who deals in goods of
that description (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an
implied warranty that the goods shall be of merchantable quality.
N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 96 (McKinney 1962).
26 308 N.Y. at 106, 123 N.E.2d at 795.
27 No feasible method existed by which to test the blood for hepatitus without destroying
it. Id.
28 See Note, supra note 6, at 307 n.31 for cases which have cited Perlmutter and extended
its reasoning.
29 33 Conn. Supp. 108, 364 A.2d 1221 (1975).
30 Id. at 111,364 A.2d at 1223. The court stated that it must look to the objective of the
parties: " 'In determining whether a contract is for sale of property or services the main
objective sought to be accomplished by the contracting parties must be looked for.'" Id. at
112, 364 A.2d at 1224 (quoting Ben Constr. Corp. v. Ventre, 23 A.D.2d 44, 45, 257 N.Y.S.2d
988, 989 (1965)).
31 33 Conn. Supp. at 113, 364 A.2d at 1224. The party wishing to establish that the
contract is one for the sale of goods carries the burden of proof on this issue. R. ANDERSON,
supra note 3, § 2-105:50.
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In applying the predominantly service test, a court may find
that the nature of the services rendered in a transaction providing
both goods and services indicates that the contract is one in which
the service aspect is meant to predominate. The parties may see the
goods involved as simply an outgrowth of the services provided even
though the successful completion of the contract may actually
culminate in or require the furnishing of these goods. For example,
in Care Display, Inc. v. Didde-Glaser, Inc. ,32 the Supreme Court of Kan-
sas held that a contract for furnishing a display booth was not within
the Article 2 statute of frauds provision (section 2-201) because the
contract was for the performance of services, not for the sale of
goods.33 Didde-Glaser wanted a display booth, but it intended to use
Care Display's creative services to get the type of booth it wanted.
The court found that the parties contemplated a contract in which
the performance of services predominated; therefore, Article 2 did
not apply.
34
Creative and other services, such as repair3 5 and building 36 serv-
ices, all result in goods of some kind, but the services provided ordi-
narily predominate. The resulting tangible goods may not be
distinguishable from other like goods, but the services, at least in the
minds of the parties, particularly the buyer's, may be distinguishable.
A buyer may have subjective reasons for choosing a particular design
service, building service, or repair service, for example. If a buyer
bases his decision to enter into a transaction including both goods
32 225 Kan. 232, 589 P.2d 599 (1979).
33 Id. at 238-39, 589 P.2d at 605. The court stated:
True, the construction, transportation, and installation of the display booth was a
part of the contract between the parties but the major objective contemplated utiliz-
ing the knowledge and expertise of Care Display to create a unique setting in which
to exhibit and promote to best advantage the products of Didde-Glaser.
225 Kan. at 239, 589 P.2d at 605.
34 Id. at 238-39, 589 P.2d at 605.
35 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky in T-Birds, Inc.
v. Thoroughbred Helicoptor Serv., 540 F. Supp. 548 (E.D. Ky. 1982) held that the U.C.C.
warranty provisions did not apply to a contract for engine work. "The predominant aspect of
the contract was the rendition of services, i.e., a major engine overhaul of T-Birds' helicop-
ter." Id. at 551. The parties primarily intended that T-Birds perform a service, not deliver
goods (in the form of replacement parts or an overhauled engine).
36 In G-W-L, Inc. v. Robichaux, 643 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. 1982), the Supreme Court of
Texas held that the Texas Business and Commerce Code (the state's version of the U.C.C.)
warranty provisions did not apply to a contract to build a house. The court determined that
the "essence" of the contract involved was "the furnishing of labor and the performance of
work required for constructing the house." Id. at 394. While the furnishing of tangible
materials was necessary to the successful completion of the contract, the court concluded that
the parties intended that the construction process predominate. Id.
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and services with a party based on the quality or nature of the serv-
ices provided by that particular party, as was the case in Care Dis-
play,37 a court could reasonably find that the parties intended the
service aspect to predominate.
Since the predominantly service test determines if the goods as-
pect or the service aspect of a contract predominates by examining
the parties' intent and objective, it is simple to apply once the parties'
intent and objective have been determined. However, the test has
limited usefulness. In cases where courts have applied the test, the
service aspect of the contract has usually been both crucial to the
contract and easy to identify.3 8 However, the intent of the parties to
contract for the sale of goods or the performance of services may not
be as distinguishable as the courts suggest. The parties usually would
not intend to bargain separately for goods and services in the sale
transaction. 39 Presumably, the buyer wants both the services and the
finished product, but may see the services as merelr a way of getting
the finished product. This may well be the case if the services are
routine. When using the predominantly service test, courts tend to
find that the U.C.C. does not apply, thereby disregarding, at least to
some extent, the U.G.C.'s policy of liberal application.40 Given both
the broad interpretation of parties' intent and objectives that courts
can employ and the possibility of disregarding the U.C.C.'s policy,
41
this test is perhaps best limited to use in cases where the services are
both crucial to the contract and unique to the particular
circumstances. 42
B. The Predominant Factor or Thrust Test
The predominant factor or thrust test applies Article 2 to a
37 225 Kan. at 239, 589 P.2d at 605.
38 This is especially true in the cases previously cited. See notes 29-37supra and accompa-
nying text.
39 See I R. ALDERMAN, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 1.12 (2d ed. 1983). The buyer usually would neither make separate purchases of
goods and services from the same seller, nor purchase goods and services from different sellers.
40 See notes 17-18 supra and accompanying text. The U.C.C.'s liberal interpretation pol-
icy favors application of the U.C.C. whenever appropriate. See U.C.C. § 1-102, comment I
(1978).
41 See, e.g., Gulash v. Stylarama, Inc., 33 Conn. Supp. 108, 364 A.2d 1221 (1975) (parties
intended a contract for the installation of a swimming pool to be one for services only). While
§ 2-102 indicates that the U.C.C. is not to apply in all cases, in circumstances where it reason-
ably could apply, as in Gulash, the U.C.C.'s goal of liberal interpretation may be thwarted.
42 Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954), and Care Dis-
play, Inc. v. Didde-Glaser, Inc., 225 Kan. 232, 589 P.2d 599 (1979), both fit into this category.
See notes 23-27, 32-34 supra and accompanying text.
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transaction if the thrust of the transaction is the sale of goods rather
than the performance of services. 43 While the predominantly service
test focuses on the services performed, the predominant factor test
focuses on the goods supplied. Unlike the predominantly service
test, the predominant factor test tends to favor application of the
U.C.C., and therefore follows more closely the Code's liberal applica-
tion policy.44
In applying the test, a court ascertains the thrust of a transac-
tion by examining the parties' intent as revealed in the contract itself,
or in the circumstances surrounding the transaction. Bonebrake v.
Cox 45 illustrates such a situation. In Bonebrake, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that a contract to de-
liver and install bowling equipment, which contained warranties
stating that the equipment would be free from defects both in mater-
ials and labor, was a contract for the sale of goods. The court articu-
lated the predominant factor test as follows:
The test for inclusion or exclusion is not whether they are mixed,
but, granting that they are mixed, whether their predominant
factor, their thrust, their purpose, reasonably stated, is the rendi-
tion of service, with goods incidentally involved (e.g., contract
with artist for painting) or is a transaction of sale, with labor inci-
dentally involved (e.g, installation of a water heater in a
bathroom) .46
Applying this test, the court said the contract language was "peculiar
to goods, not services.147 The court also reasoned that although the
installation of the equipment was a necessary part of the contract,
the thrust of the contract was the sale of the equipment, since the
buyers primarily wanted and bought the equipment. The labor,
though significant, was "incidentally involved.
'48
In addition to examining the parties' intent, a court may also
ascertain the thrust of a transaction by looking at the nature of the
services involved. The services may indeed be necessary to the suc-
cessful completion of the contract, but only insofar as they make the
tangible goods useful.49 In such cases the services are performed only
43 See Note, supra note 6, at 308-12.
44 See note 17 supra.
45 499 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1974).
46 Id. at 960.
47 Id. at 958.
48 Id. at 960.
49 In Meyers v. Henderson Constr. Co., 147 NJ. Super. 77, 370 A.2d 547 (1977), the
court held that the U.C.C. applied to a contract to supply and install overhead doors. The
unassembled doors were put together and installed in the buyer's building. The court noted
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as a means to an end, and not for their own sake. If a court finds that
the services fulfilled this purpose only, it will likely find that the pre-
dominant thrust of the contract was one for the sale of goods.
Bonebrake, where the services were needed only to make the bowling
alley equipment functional, is illustrative.50
Also illustrative is Rffi v. Black.51 In R#f, the Court of Appeals
of Kentucky concluded that the warranty provisions of the U.C.C.
applied to a contract for the installation of a swimming pool. The
court stated that the warranty provisions "apply to services when the
sale is primarily one of goods and the services are necessary to insure
that those goods are merchantable and fit for the ordinary pur-
pose."' 52 As in Bonebrake, the services in R#f were necessary, but only
to the extent that they made the goods useful.
53
Like the predominantly service test, the predominant factor test
is also simple to apply, and it allows for liberal application of the
U.C.C.,54 but also like the predominantly service test, it has its disad-
vantages. The test, when applied expansively,55 could become over-
inclusive. Goods will be involved in most transactions, and will
generally be used by the buyer after the services are completed. The
test gives a court a great deal of discretion. In applying the predomi-
nant factor test a court could, by acknowledging these remaining
goods, encompass in the U.C.C. all transactions which are not wholly
service contracts, a result probably not intended by the U.C.C.56
that the "overhead doors were useless without the performance of installation services," and
stated that both the sale of the goods and the performance of the services were necessary. Id.
at 82, 370 A.2d at 550. Nevertheless, the court approved the Bonebrake test, stating that the
buyer's "predominant reason" for making the contract was to get the doors. The court used
the Bonebrake test because it knew of no "surer way" to determine whether the U.C.C. applied
to the transaction. Id.
50 See notes 45-48 supra and accompanying text.
51 548 S.W.2d 175 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
52 Id. at 177.
53 Cf. Gulash v. Stylarama, Inc., 33 Conn. Supp. 108, 364 A.2d 1221 (1975) (with facts
that mirror those in Rtr). The decision in Rzje' using the predominant factor test contradicts
the decision in Gulash using the predominantly service test. See note 64 infa.
54 See note 44 supra.
55 By its own admission, the court in Snyder v. Herbert Greenbaum and Assoc., 38 Md.
App. 144, 380 A.2d 618 (1977), applied the predominant factor test expansively. See text
accompanying notes 85-87 inra.
56 In Computer Serv. v. Beacon Mfg. Co., 328 F. Supp. 653 (D.S.C. 1970), afd, 443 F.2d
906 (4th Cir. 1971), the court held that a contract for data processing services was a contract
for the performance of services, not for the sale of goods, "and to claim to the contrary strains
the imagination." 328 F. Supp. at 655. However, if the predominant factor test were ex-
panded to acknowledge all remaining tangible items, the resulting computer printouts could
be classified as goods. Article 2 would then apply to this transaction. See note 11 supra.
If a court applied similar reasoning to the facts of T-Birds, Inc. v. Thoroughbred
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C. The Final Product Test
The third test courts have used to determine whether a particu-
lar transaction falls within the U.C.C. is the final product test. When
applying this test, a court focuses on the end or final product to de-
termine whether it fits the U.C.C.'s definition of goods.5 7 This defi-
nition emphasizes special manufacture, 58 movability, and
identification of goods to the contract. 59 Courts applying the final
product test in a case balance these indicia against the services in-
volved in the transaction to determine whether the contract is one for
goods or for services. Unlike the predominantly service test or the
predominant factor test, the final product test relies on a strict read-
ing of the U.C.C.'s definition of goods. 6°
By applying the final product test, courts acknowledge that serv-
ices are often crucial to the successful completion of a transaction.
Though the services involved in the transaction may be substantial,
if the end product is specially manufactured and movable, a strict
application of the final product test by a court can bring the transac-
tion under the provisions of the U.C.C. For example, in Lake Wales
Publishing Co. v. Florida Visitor, Inc. ,61 the District Court of Appeal of
Florida held that the U.C.C. statute of limitations applied to a con-
tract for printing pamphlets. Basing its decision on the U.C.C.'s defi-
nition of goods, the court reasoned that the pamphlets were goods
because they were movable when finished. 62 In addition, the pam-
phlets were specially manufactured, a further reason for fitting them
into the U.C.C.'s definition of goods. The court acknowledged that
services played a large part in the production of the pamphlets, but
concluded that "any services rendered were of necessity related to
production of the items."
'63
As its name suggests, the final product test emphasizes that
which is left when the contract is completed. Services may be neces-
sary to give goods their final form. However, if these services are
Helicoptor Serv., 540 F. Supp. 548 (E.D. Ky. 1982), the resulting overhauled engine could
also be classified as goods, and Article 2 would apply to the repair work. See note 35 supra.
57 See note 2.supra.
58 Specially manufactured goods are "goods that are designed specially for the buyer and
goods that follow the same design as the other products of the seller and the 'special' element
is found in the fact that the seller produces the goods in order to fill the particular order of the
particular buyer." R. ANDERSON, supra note 3, § 2-105:42.
59 See Note, supra note 6, at 309-12.
60 See notes 61-66 infra and accompanying text.
61 335 So. 2d 335 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).




likely to follow a specific plan, and if the final product can be con-
templated in detail before it actually exists, then the final product is
identifiable when the contract is made and the product can be classi-
fied as goods and thus brought under the U.C.C. Stretching the
final product test to its outer boundaries, the Appellate Court of Illi-
nois in Meeker v. Hamilton Grain Elevator Co. 64 held that the U.C.C.
applied to a contract for the installation of grain bins. Even though
the bins were unassembled at the time the contract was made, and
although a good deal of service was required to put them together,
they were movable and identifiable as bins.
65
On the other hand, although a transaction may result in a final
tangible product, under the final product test the transaction may
not be covered by the U.C.C. if it does not meet the U.C.C.'s "mova-
bility" requirement for goods. Though a house is a tangible, identifi-
able product, it is not movable, thereby preventing the contract for
its construction from being covered by the U.C.C. In G-W-L, Inc. v.
Robichaux, the court came to this conclusion, emphasizing the Code's
requirement of movability. 66
Courts attempt to base the final product test in the U.C.C.'s def-
inition of goods, and while this attempt works well at times,67 at
other times it may be too restrictive.68 Parties to any contract natu-
rally contemplate some end to all contracts. If any tangible, movable
object is contemplated, the final product test could bring all con-
tracts in which such an object is contemplated under the U.C.C. Be-
cause some tangible goods are produced under many contracts, if the
service aspect were truly meant to predominate, 69 applying the final
product test would mischaracterize the parties' intentions and lead to
inequitable results.
64 110 Ill. App. 3d 668, 442 N.E.2d 921 (1982).
65 Id. at 671, 442 N.E.2d at 923.
66 643 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Tex. 1982). The court in G-W-L relied heavily on the concept of
movability when it held that the Texas Business and Commerce Code did not cover a con-
tract to build a house. The house was not movable within the scope of the Code's definition
of goods, nor was the house to be moved at a later time. Id.
67 The test worked well in Lake Wales because the printed pamphlets fitted neatly into
the U.C.C.'s definition of goods. See text accompanying notes 61-63 supra.
68 The court in G-W-L based its decision on a literal reading of the Code's definition of
goods, and its holding under this interpretation was in effect a foregone conclusion. A house
is not commonly considered a movable object. Some might argue that the U.C.C.'s goal of
liberal application was frustrated. See note 66 supra.
69 Once again, Computer Serv. v. Beacon Mfg. Co., 328 F. Supp. 653 (D.S.C. 1970), aj'd,
443 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1971), illustrates this point. The final, tangible product was a com-
puter printout. If the court had applied the final product test to bring the transaction under
the U.C.C., the focus of the contract, the actual services, would have been ignored.
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D. The Policy Test
The final test used by the courts is the policy test. In applying
the policy test, a court simply looks at the particular facts in question
and determines on an ad hoc basis if the U.C.C. should apply to the
transaction. 70 This test has no set criteria, but rather focuses on is-
sues of equity and public policy.
In using the policy test a court can acknowledge that in many
transactions the parties do not have the same levels of knowledge and
experience. 71 The buyer in particular may be relying on the seller's
professed superior knowledge and experience. In such transactions
the service aspect may be great, and the tangible items provided may
be consumed in the process or incorporated into a larger item. How-
ever, a court applying the policy test may use the buyer's reasonable
expectations and reliance on the seller's superior knowledge and ex-
perience as justification for holding that the U.C.C., and conse-
quently its consumer protectionism, applies to the transaction. For
example, in Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc. ,72 the Supreme Court of New
Jersey stated that the implied warranty provisions of the U.C.C.
should apply to a transaction (a permanent wave given in the de-
fendant's beauty parlor), even though it was not technically a sale.73
Noting that public policy encourages reasonable reliance on superior
knowledge and skill, the court reasoned that because the defendant
had asserted such superiority by offering the service, the plaintiff
would be entitled to protection under the implied warranty provi-
sions of the Code, provided she could prove her case. 74
70 See text accompanying note 9 sepra.
71 This is another instance in which a buyer may choose a particular seller for a particu-
lar reason. See text accompanying notes 35-36 supra.
72 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969). The plaintiff suffered injuries to her scalp and hair
after she received a permanent wave in defendant's beauty parlor. Id. at 589-91, 258 A.2d at
699-700.
73 Id. at 593, 258 A.2d at 701. The trial court had found that the transaction was not a
sale within the scope of U.C.C. § 2-106, because no separate charge had been made for the
solution. The Supreme Court of New Jersey felt this distinction was artificial. Id. at 592-93,
258 A.2d at 700-01.
74 Id. at 601, 258 A.2d at 705. The court based its decision on the facts that (1) the
defendant had exclusive control over the choice and application of the solution, and (2) the
plaintiff reasonably expected that the defendant's superior knowledge in the area would pro-
tect her. Id. at 593-94, 258 A.2d at 701. See R. ALDERMAN, supra note 39, § 1.12 n.28.
Similarly, in Worrell v. Barnes, 87 Nev. 204,484 P.2d 573 (1971), the Supreme Court of
Nevada found a contractor liable for fire damage caused by a defective fitting on a water
heater installed, but not supplied, by the contractor. The court based its decision on the
plaintiff's reasonable expectation that she could rely on the defendant's superior skill. Id. at
208, 484 P.2d at 576.
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On the positive side, the policy test allows courts not only to
liberally apply the U.C.C. by finding that it covers transactions in
question, 75 but also to protect the reasonable expectations of consum-
ers by acknowledging their reliance on the expertise of sellers. The
policy test frees a court from the mechanical application of one of the
other tests in order to consider the equities involved in a particular
situation. However, the policy test's shortcoming is its ad hoc deci-
sional nature, which leads to inconsistencies and makes parties un-
sure of their status in the event a dispute arises. In a commercial
setting, this is especially significant since businesses must, if possible,
structure their transactions to avoid such liability. Any solution to
the problem must therefore balance the flexibility needed for a court
to solve equitably each dispute and the certainty needed for business
planning and negotiation.
III. A Proposed "Three-Tiered" Test
The current tests can and do result in courts inconsistently ap-
plying the U.C.C.76 A single, comprehensive test might eliminate
some of the confusion and lead to more consistent decisions. A new
test should focus on what is done in addition to supplying tangible
products. The amount, type, and difficulty of service supplied plays
a large part in determining whether a mixed contract is predomi-
nantly one for the sale of goods or for the performance of services.
Other factors to be considered when formulating the test include the
parties' intent and expectations as reflected in the contract, and any
equitable considerations involved. Therefore, a three-tiered analysis
would be involved, with an examination of the service given priority,
and the parties' intent and expectations and equitable considerations
given a lower priority.
The first factor to be examined in the new test is the intent and
expectations of the parties. If the parties to the contract specify
75 Liberal interpretation of the U.C.C. under this or any other test must be "limited to its
reason." U.C.C. § 1-102, comment 1 (1978). See notes 17-18 supra and accompanying text.
76 The predominantly service test and the predominant factor test illustrate this inconsis-
tency clearly. "Any test that is predicated on what is deemed to be the essence or predomi-
nant character of a contract has in it a considerable amount of subjectivity. Inevitably,
therefore, different conclusions on facts that seem more identical than distinguishable can be
expected." R. DUESENBERG & L. KING, supra note 11, § 1.03[1]. Compare Gulash v. Sty-
larama, Inc., 33 Conn. Supp. 108, 364 A.2d 1221 (1975), with Riffe v. Black, 548 S.W.2d 175
(Ky. Ct. App. 1975). The Gulash court applied the predominantly service test, and concluded
that the contract for the installation of a swimming pool did not come under Article 2. How-
ever, the Rtffe court applied the predominant factor or thrust test and concluded that a simi-
lar contract was indeed covered by Article 2. See Annot., 5 A.L.R. 4th 501 (1981).
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whether the contract is to be for the sale of goods or for the perform-
ance of services, or in a mixed contract, which aspect is to
predominate, their explicit expressions should control whether Arti-
cle 2 provisions apply. 77 However, parties rarely make such explicit
expressions of intent in the contract itself, and disputes often arise.- If
the parties' intent and expectations cannot be ascertained, courts
should then turn to the next factors: the nature and difficulty of the
services, and the equities involved in the transaction.
An analysis of the nature and difficulty of the services involved
must be the major factor in a new, single test. A court cannot deter-
mine whether the contract is for the sale of goods or the performance
of services based on the presence of goods alone. If it could, Article 2
could apply to all contracts, from those for the sale of a television set
in a retail store to those in which a television repairman replaces a
tube while fixing the set. Therefore, the nature and difficulty of the
services provided in mixed contracts should largely determine
whether Article 2 applies.
If the services performed in connection with the supplying of
tangible products are routine in that they follow a standard proce-
dure, a court should find the contract to be one for the sale of goods,
and thus subject to Article 2. In such a situation, the services would
be performed only to make the desired goods useful. These services
would include hooking up a piece of equipment to make it usable, or
putting together pieces of a product according to a standard plan or
procedure. The characteristics of these types of services are: 1) they
are necessary to make the goods useful, but are usually performed
according to standard procedures, 2) they would require skill to be
executed properly, but not necessarily to be created, and 3) they
would not be unique to the circumstances.
Applying this analysis, a court should find that a transaction
such as installing a pool, as in Gulash v. Stylarama, Inc. ,78 to be not a
contract for the performance of services, but rather a contract for the
sale of goods. Though the services involved in installing a swimming
pool are significant and must be performed properly to make the
77 See R. DUESENBERG & L. KING, supra note 11, § 1.03[1]. The parties' freedom to con-
struct their own agreement is of course limited by their obligation under the U.C.C. to act in
good faith. See U.C.C. § 1-203 (1978). Unlike many other provisions in the U.C.C., § 1-203
does not say "unless otherwise agreed." The parties cannot agree not to act in good faith. See
also A. SQUILLANTE & J. FONSECA, supra note 18, § 2:1.
78 33 Conn. Supp. 108, 364 A.2d 1221 (1975). Under the proposed test, the decision in
Gulash would be consistent with that in Rifle v. Black, 548 S.W.2d 175 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
See note 76 supra.
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product useful, they follow a standard procedure (modified as neces-
sary for individual circumstances, but generally following the same
pattern).
On the other hand, if the services are specialized in that they
require originality or special skill, a court should deem the contract
in question to be one for the performance of services, and thus not
covered by Article 2.79 In such a situation the services themselves
would predominate. The "end result," the goods, would be inciden-
tal to the process or service. These services would include creative
activities such as designing a system, compiling data, or providing
medical services. While these types of services would often include
supplying goods to make the services more beneficial, the services
themselves would predominate. The goods would be standard, but
the services would be creative and unique to the particular
circumstances.
Under this analysis, the decisions in Computer Servicenters,80 where
the court held that data processing was services, T-Birds, Inc. ,8
where the court held that helicopter repairs were primarily services,
and Care Display, 2 where the court held that providing a customized
display booth was primarily a service, would remain the same. How-
ever, this analysis would change the decision in Worrell,83 where the
court found the U.C.C. covered the installation of a defective fitting
on a water heater not supplied by the installer. The transaction
would no longer be considered one for the sale of goods, but rather
would be one in which the repair work, or services, predominated.
8 4
Finally, any new test would have to allow for equitable consider-
ations. These considerations can only be generalized. The facts and
circumstances of each case are necessarily unique, and a court's
mechanical application of a test can lead to restrictive decisions
based on form rather than on substance. For example, the court in
Snyder 85 admitted that services seemed to predominate in a contract
for the sale and installaton of carpet, but nevertheless mechanically
79 See R. DUESENBERG & L. KING, suira note 11, § 1.03[1].
80 328 F. Supp. 653 (D.S.C. 1970), aj'd, 443 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1971); see note 56 supra.
81 540 F. Supp. 548 (E.D. Ky. 1982); see note 35 supra.
82 225 Kan. 232, 589 P.2d 599 (1979); see text accompanying notes 32-34 supra.
83 87 Nev. 204, 484 P.2d 573 (1971); see note 74 supra.
84 An aggrieved party would not be left entirely without avenues of recovery if the
U.C.C. did not apply. Depending on the particular circumstances, a party might still seek
recovery under a contract theory of breach of contract, or if circumstances warrant, under a
tort theory of negligence, or strict liability for products. The U.C.C. is not the only remedy
available in commercial circles. See U.C.C. § 1-103 (1978).
85 38 Md. App. 144, 380 A.2d 618 (1977).
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applied the Bonebrake test used previously in the jurisdiction, and
held the contract to be one for the sale of goods.8 6 While the court
acted properly in considering precedent in the jurisdiction, it could
reasonably have taken note of the structure of the transaction; the
contractor purchased the carpet "for the sole purpose of supplying it
for installation, ' 87 and under the circumstances could have held the
contract to be one for the performance of services. Therefore, equita-
ble considerations such as unique facts, reasonable expectations, and
reliance could be accommodated as necessary without jeopardizing
the basic consistency of decisions.
IV. Conclusion
The problem of whether Article 2 of the U.C.C. applies to a
transaction arises frequently. Courts have devised four tests to solve
this problem; each attempts to determine whether in mixed contracts
the transaction is primarily one for the sale of goods or for the per-
formance of services. While any of these tests can help courts make
this determination, their application has not led to consistent
decisions.
The proposed new test uses a three-tiered analysis, examining
the intent and expectations of the parties, the nature and difficulty of
the services provided, and any equitable considerations involved in
the transaction. Under this proposed test, a court would treat the
nature and difficulty of the services performed in the transaction as
the major factor in making the goods/services determination. While
this test cannot anticipate all situations or solve all problems, it
would enable courts and practitioners to make the goods/services de-
termination more simply, and it would lead to more consistent deci-
sions.
Cqrstal L. Miller
86 Id. at 148, 380 A.2d at 621.
87 Id. at 147, 380 A.2d at 621.
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